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1431 
RIDESHARING’S HOUSE OF CARDS: O’CONNOR V. 
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. AND THE VIABILITY OF 
UBER’S LABOR MODEL IN WASHINGTON 
Henry Ross 
Abstract: Ridesharing companies, namely Uber and Lyft, have taken the transportation 
market by storm. These companies offer a competitive alternative to taxis through using 
smartphone apps and more efficient service offerings. As part of their business model, 
ridesharing companies treat their drivers as independent contractors rather than employees to 
minimize labor costs. However, drivers do not benefit from remedial labor statutes and thus 
(1) must pay for operating costs, (2) are not guaranteed a minimum wage, and (3) do not 
receive overtime pay. In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., a class of California Uber 
drivers are challenging their independent contractor status under California law. The test 
used by California courts to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an 
employee differs slightly from the test that Washington courts apply. In 2012, the 
Washington State Supreme Court adopted a worker-friendly “economic realities” test for 
determining whether workers are in fact independent contractors. Applying the lessons from 
O’Connor to Washington independent contractor law, this Comment calls into question the 
viability of Uber’s labor model in Washington. 
INTRODUCTION 
Uber, the ridesharing behemoth, has upended the transportation 
network in cities across the globe. As an alternative to the inefficiencies 
of traditional taxis, the company uses a smartphone app to connect 
customers with its drivers, which has proved to be a hit with customers.
1
 
This immense popularity has driven Uber to expand into over 270 cities 
and counting worldwide within a five-year period, and has led many to 




With a network of over 160,000 drivers in the United States alone, 
Uber has amassed an army of alleged independent contractors to drive 
                                                     
1. In response to Uber’s growth, some taxi companies have developed their own apps. Alexa 
Vaughn, Seattle Yellow Cab on the Comeback Path, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014, 8:24 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-yellow-cab-on-the-comeback-path/. 
2. See Scott Austin, Chris Canipe & Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/; Jay Yarow, At $12 Billion, Uber 
Would Become the Most Valuable Startup in the World, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2014, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/at-12-billion-uber-would-become-the-most-valuable-startup-in-the-
world-2014-5. 
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 Uber’s independent contractor policy tracks a growing trend 
among American companies of using independent contractors to avoid 
workplace regulations.
4
 By virtue of their independent contractor 
classification, Uber drivers and other independent contractors do not 
have employee benefits, pay expenses out of pocket, and are not entitled 
to guaranteed hourly wages or a salary.
5
 
In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
6
 Californian Uber drivers are 
challenging their independent contractor status.
7
 The plaintiffs allege 
that Uber has improperly used the independent contractor designation to 
save costs; in other words, Uber has made its rapid growth possible by 
sacrificing full-employee benefits for its drivers to capitalize on lower 
labor costs.
8
 Thus far, the drivers have been remarkably successful in the 
suit. The trial court refused to grant Uber’s motion for summary 
judgment after applying California’s relatively employer-friendly 
independent contractor test.
9
 Indeed, based on the drivers’ apparent 
momentum in the case, many have speculated as to whether this lawsuit 
could lead to the end of Uber drivers’ independent contractor status in 
California.
10
 The “right of control” test applied by the Northern District 
of California trial judge is based on California’s independent contractor 
law.
11
 The “right of control” test is the descendent of the traditional test 
still used to determine whether the law may hold an employer liable for 
the tortious conduct of an employee.
12
 
                                                     
3. Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Kreuger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-
Partners in the United States (Jan. 22, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-static/comms/PDF/ 
Uber_Driver-Partners_Hall_Kreuger_2015.pdf. 
4. Joshua Wright, Data Spotlight: Independent Contractors on the Rise, ECON. MODELING 
SPECIALISTS INT’L (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.economicmodeling.com/2011/04/29/independent-
contractors-other-noncovered-workers-on-the-rise/. 
5. Maya Kosoff, 2 Lawsuits Could Dramatically Alter the Business Model for Uber and Lyft, 
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2015, 11:10 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-business-
models-threatened-by-lawsuits-2015-1. 
6. No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015). 
7. Id. at *1 (order denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment). 
8. See id. 
9. Id. at *15. 
10. See, e.g., Alison Griswold, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Trial That Could Devastate the 
“Sharing Economy,” SLATE (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/ 
2015/03/12/uber_lyft_employment_cases_juries_could_decide_the_legal_fate_of_the_sharing.html. 
11. See O’Connor, 2015 WL 1069092, at *4–5. 
12. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and 
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 351 (2001) (“The [right to 
control] rule that prevailed was based on an original facet of Blackstone’s master-servant model: a 
master was liable for an act of the servant commanded by the master or committed in the course of 
the servant’s service controlled by his master.”). 
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In contrast to California’s test, in 2012 the Washington State Supreme 
Court adopted an “economic realities” test for determining whether a 
worker is an independent contractor for the purposes of the Washington 
Minimum Wage Act.
13
 The “economic realities” test, while similar to 
the “right of control” test, is a more progressive, worker-friendly test 
that can often lead to a different result.
14
 
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate the legal reverberations 
that O’Connor could have in Washington. If the drivers ultimately 
succeed in their case using the more company-friendly California test in 
O’Connor, the Uber labor model could face a serious and credible 
challenge in any jurisdiction where drivers choose to bring such a suit. 
Part I examines the regulatory backdrop of ridesharing companies, and 
how the ascendency of Uber and other ridesharing companies has 
challenged traditional transportation regulatory schemes. Part II explores 
the factual and legal underpinnings of O’Connor. Part III discusses 
Washington’s independent contractor law, particularly in light of the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package 
System, Inc.
15
 decision, which signaled a new, worker-friendly approach 
to independent contractor law in Washington. Finally, Part IV analyzes 
Uber drivers’ likelihood of success in a misclassification claim, and 
ultimately concludes that Uber’s labor model may not be viable under 
Washington law. 
I. RIDESHARING COMPANY LABOR PRACTICES HAVE 
DISRUPTED TRANSPORTATION REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORKS 
Uber has disrupted nearly a century of taxi regulations in America.
16
 
Most notable to consumers, Uber has brought new technology, new price 
structures, and consistently reliable service into the market.
17
 Less 
visible to consumers are the labor practices these companies use in 
hiring and managing drivers. Uber officially treats its drivers as 
                                                     
13. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 871, 281 P.3d 289, 299 
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.46.005–.920 (2014). 
14. Kevin J. Miller, Welfare and the Minimum Wage: Are Workfare Participants “Employees” 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (1999). 
15. 174 Wash. 2d 851, 281 P.3d 289 (2012). 
16. See, e.g., David Greene, Upstart Car Service Butts Heads with D.C.’s Taxis, NPR NEWS (Jan. 
31, 2012, 2:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/31/146123433/upstart-car-service-butts-heads-with-
d-c-s-taxis. 
17. Id. 
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 The independent contractor designation 
carries numerous advantages for Uber’s bottom line: it does not have to 
guarantee its drivers minimum wage and does not reimburse drivers for 
on-the-job expenses incurred (e.g., gas and vehicle maintenance).
19
 To 
understand how the independent contractor designation plays into the 
Uber model, it is critical to understand the nature of the company, its 
service offering, and the market in which it operates. 
A.  Uber and the Onslaught of Competition in the Taxi Industry 
Startup competitors of traditional taxi services have wedged their way 
into a once airtight taxi market. The most notable competitors, Uber and 
Lyft, use a simplified model that incorporates smartphone technology to 
address two operational challenges faced by traditional taxi companies—
dispatch and payment.
20
 Instead of the traditional taxi-hailing process, 
customers can order a ride on their phone through a simple smartphone 
app.
21
 Drivers do not accept cash, and a customer’s credit card 
information is already stored—and automatically charged following a 
ride—on his or her phone by the smartphone app.
22
 Uber and Lyft use a 
“surge pricing” model that raises prices when demand outpaces the rate 
at which the services can respond to requests for rides.
23
 These new 
companies also use customer reviews to reflect a driver’s quality, which 
the company monitors as a form of remote driver supervision.
24
 The 
rapid growth of these new services reflects their popularity.
25
 Indeed, 
                                                     
18. Griswold, supra note 10. 
19. Kosoff, supra note 5. 
20. Alexa Vaughn, Ride-Share Cars: Illegal, and All Over Seattle, SEATTLE TIMES (June 16, 
2013, 9:09 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021206141_ridesharingappsxml.html. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Dan Kedmey, This Is How Uber’s ‘Surge Pricing’ Works, TIME (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://time.com/3633469/uber-surge-pricing/; Connor Adams Sheets, Uber, Lyft New Year’s Eve 
Surge Pricing to Cost Riders, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014, 7:35 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ 
uber-lyft-new-years-eve-2015-surge-pricing-cost-riders-1771582. 
24. Sam Roudman, Uber Drivers Organize Themselves in Seattle, Other Drivers Look to Do 
Same, TECHPRESIDENT (May 27, 2014), http://techpresident.com/news/25078/uber-drivers-
organize-seattle-look-elsewhere. 
25. Although the merits of less restrictive taxi policies are beyond the scope of this Comment, at 
least one survey of economists suggests that ridesharing services disrupting the traditional 
regulatory scheme is economically desirable. Taxi Competition, CHI. BOOTH IGM FORUM (Sept. 29, 
2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID= 
SV_eyDrhnya7vAPrX7. A panel of over forty economists was asked whether they agree or disagree 
with the proposition that “[l]etting car services such as Uber or Lyft compete with taxi firms on 
equal footing regarding genuine safety and insurance requirements, but without restrictions on 
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many economists believe that customers are ultimately benefitting from 
the introduction of ridesharing companies into the transportation web.
26
 
Uber now operates in more than 200 cities in more than fifty countries,
27
 




Public opinion surveys show why ridesharing services have 
experienced such rapid growth. In a study commissioned by the City of 
Seattle in September 2013, a time when Uber and Lyft were growing in 
the area, over ninety percent of ridesharing customers rated the response 
time of their ridesharing vehicle as “Good” or “Very Good.”
29
 In 
contrast, only fifty percent of taxi customers rated the response time of 
their vehicle as “Good” or “Very Good.”
30
 The study also found that 
“[o]f 105 negative comments [received during the survey], 102 were 
related to taxis. Of 16 positive comments, only 1 was related to taxis.”
31
 
Additionally, on six specific metrics polled—(1) willingness to accept 
credit cards, (2) courtesy of driver, (3) route knowledge of driver, (4) 
appearance of vehicle, (5) promptness of arrival, and (6) ease of 
booking/hailing a ride—ridesharing services received higher customer 
ratings than taxis in every category.
32
 
Despite a sleeker service, Uber’s business is in a legal grey area at 
best, and is patently illegal at worst.
33
 Uber generally uses a “wait and 
see” attitude when entering new markets—the service expands until 
local governments actively enforce regulations or bring legal action.
34
 
Inevitably, the markets that Uber enters must respond in some fashion, 
                                                     
prices or routes, raises consumer welfare.” Id. Every single economist either agreed or strongly 
agreed. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. 53 Countries: Available Locally, Expanding Globally, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities 
(last visited May 22, 2015). 
28. John Shinal, Uber’s Valuation Tops Public Twitter, LinkedIn, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2014, 
7:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/shinal/2014/12/08/uber-valuation-
compared-with-twitter-linkedin-amazon-ebay-airbnb/20113797/ (examining current valuations and 
speculating that Uber could give an IPO exceeding $100 billion dollars within a few years). 
29. James M. Cooper & Ray Mundy, City of Seattle and King County Taxi, for Hire Vehicle and 
Limousine Services Demand Study, Service Quality—Response Time Experiences, CITY SEATTLE 
(Sept. 2013), http://clerk.seattle.gov/public/meetingrecords/2013/taxi20130903_1a.pdf. 
30. Id.  
31. Id. at Service Quality—Key Observations. 
32. Id. at Secret Shopper Surveys. 
33. Greene, supra note 16. 
34. See Michael B. Farrell, State Reverses Ban on Uber Car Service Ordering App, BOS. GLOBE 
(Aug. 17, 2012, 1:55 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/08/15/state-reverses-ban-
uber-car-service-ordering-app/yQTQNP9c1BQiEM3Mrri2oO/story.html; Greene, supra note 16. 
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and many jurisdictions have elected to ban the service outright to 
maintain the status quo for taxis.
35
 
Though Uber largely encounters resistance because its services do not 
conform to local taxi regulations, its aggressive business practices and a 
series of public gaffes are responsible for at least a portion of that 
resistance from customers, policymakers, and regulators alike.
36
 For 
example, news leaked in November 2014 that Uber executive Emil 
Michael once publicly suggested that Uber might use personal data 




The “surge-pricing” method has also cast Uber in a bad light.
38
 
During a recent shooting and hostage situation in Sydney, Australia, 
Uber applied surge pricing to the neighborhoods near the crisis because 
of sudden demand for transportation in the area.
39
 This led to public 
outcry.
40
 Despite its efforts to brand itself as a customer-friendly 
alternative to taxis, these public gaffes serve to reinforce Uber’s image 
as a cutthroat company when it comes to costs and revenues. 
B.  The City of Seattle’s Response to Uber’s Emergence 
After a lengthy period of non-enforcement, the City of Seattle became 
America’s first major city to comprehensively address the influx of 
ridesharing services.
41
 The ordinance resulting from these deliberations 
created a permitting scheme that brought ridesharing companies, who 
had been operating in Seattle without regulations for nearly three years,
42
 
                                                     
35. See Sara Roth, Portland Sues Uber Alleging Illegal Operations, USA TODAY (Dec. 10, 2014, 
12:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/12/08/portland-sues-uber-for-illegal-
operations/20117155/ (quoting Portland Mayor Charlie Hales: “Taxi cab companies follow rules on 
public health and safety. So do hotels and restaurants and construction companies and scores of 
other service providers. Because everyone agrees: good regulations make for a safer community. 
Uber disagrees, so we’re seeking a court injunction”). 
36. Frank Pallotta, Uber Exec Suggests Digging up Dirt on Journalists, CNN MONEY (Nov. 18, 
2014, 10:25 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/18/media/buzzfeed-uber-dinner-journalists/ 
index.html; Uber ‘Truly Sorry’ for Price Rise During Sydney Siege, BBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30595406. 
37. Pallotta, supra note 36.  
38. See Nicky Wolf, Uber Ride for Sleepy New Year’s Eve Partygoer Ends in $900 Bill, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/06/uber-900-bill-
atlanta-new-years-eve-partygoer. 
39. Uber ‘Truly Sorry’ for Price Rise During Sydney Siege, supra note 36. 
40. Id. 
41. See Vaughn, supra note 20. 
42. Alexia Tsotsis, Spotted! Secret Uber Drivers on the Streets of Seattle, TECHCRUNCH (July 25, 
2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/25/uber-seattle/. 
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into the regulatory environment.
43
 Perhaps the most controversial aspect 
of the legislation was that it placed a cap of 150 drivers on each 
ridesharing company operating in Seattle.
44
 The Seattle City Council 
expressed serious concern about the effect of ridesharing on the taxi 
market, which serves a public purpose by transporting the disabled and 
meeting transportation demands for public events.
45
 The Council chose 
the 150-driver cap despite the fact that there were, according to 
ridesharing companies, more than 2000 rideshare drivers in Seattle at 
that time.
46
 According to rideshare companies, this limitation would 
have destroyed their business model in the area and forced ridesharing 
companies to leave the market due to decreased revenue.
47
 In effect, 
these regulations would have compromised ridesharing companies’ 
supply and demand approach, as they would have been forced into the 
rigid constructs of traditional taxi regulation. 
Seattle’s ordinance lasted just a few months before the Council 
repealed and replaced it.
48
 The Council based its decision to rewrite the 
regulations in large part on the specter of a ballot initiative designed to 
gut the first ridesharing ordinance.
49
 The most controversial portion of 
the first ordinance—the cap on rideshare drivers—was removed from 
the second ordinance.
50
 This cap ultimately gave ridesharing companies 
a final victory; although the regulations retained some critical 
provisions,
51
 removing caps on drivers allowed for unfettered growth. 
Following Seattle’s lead, many prominent American cities have 
passed ordinances bringing ridesharing services into the fold, or are in 
the process of doing so.
52
 Thus, the significance of the legal issues 
                                                     
43. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124441 (Mar. 17, 2014). 
44. Id. § 11(B). 
45. Because ridesharing drivers generally use their own vehicles, imposing such a requirement on 
ridesharing drivers would be impractical. Taylor Soper, Seattle City Leaders Sound off on Ride-
Sharing Dilemma – Who Do You Agree with?, GEEKWIRE (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/recap-city-council-meeting/.  
46. Vaughn, supra note 20. 
47. Id. 
48. See Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124526 (July 7, 2014). 





52. See, e.g., Ed Arnold, Uber Ready to Be Street Legal in Memphis, MEMPHIS BUS. J. (Jan. 23, 
2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/news/2015/01/23/uber-ready-to-be-street-legal-in-
memphis.html (Memphis); Jeff Balke, Uber, Lyft Now Legal in Houston After Council Vote, HOUS. 
PRESS (Aug. 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.houstonpress.com/news/2014/08/uber_lyft_now_ 
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surrounding Uber’s service will only expand. One of these issues sure to 
become more prominent relates to the company’s labor practices. 
C.  Uber Drivers’ Labor Practices and Workplace Environment 
Independent contractor status is founded upon the scope, duties, and 
nature of an individual’s work.
53
 While employees have recourse and 
guarantees for certain workplace standards, independent contractors are 
essentially on their own.
54
 Some estimate that companies can save up to 
forty percent in administrative costs by designating employees as 
independent contractors.
55
 Understanding the facts related to an 
individual’s employment is therefore critical to determining whether 
status as an independent contractor is proper.
56
 
Uber is resolute about its drivers’ independent contractor status.
57
 The 
company’s employment contract with drivers, which it terms a “software 
license and online services agreement,” reflects this.
58
 Throughout the 
contract, the language evidences a concerted effort by Uber to disclaim 
all responsibility for the drivers’ contact with potential customers.
59
 For 
example, when explaining a driver’s relationship with Uber, the contract 
states that: 
You [driver] acknowledge and agree that Company’s provision 
                                                     
legal_in_houston_after_council_vote.php (Houston); Tom Benning, Dallas Council Approves New 
Car-for-Hire Rules; Uber and Lyft to Be Able to Operate Legally, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Dec. 10, 
2014, 2:02 PM), http://cityhallblog.dallasnews.com/2014/12/dallas-council-approves-new-car-for-
hire-rules-uber-and-lyft-to-be-able-to-operate-legally.html/ (Dallas); Hal Dardick & Jon Hilkevitch, 
Chicago Rideshare Regulations Approved, CHI. TRIB. (May 28, 2014, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/chi-chicago-rideshare-regulations-approved-
20140528-story.html (Chicago); Paul Nussbaum, Ride Service Uber Gets OK in Pittsburgh Area, 
PHILLY.COM (Aug. 21, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/transportation/ 
20140822_Ride_service_Uber_gets_OK_in_Pittsburgh_area.html (Pittsburgh). 
53. Carlson, supra note 12, at 297–99. 
54. Id. at 301. Therein lies the attraction of independent contractors to companies. 
55. Adam H. Miller, Curbing Worker Misclassification in Vermont: Proposed State Actions to 
Improve a National Problem, 39 VT. L. REV. 207, 210 (2014). 
56. See, e.g., id. 
57. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 13.1 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
58. Id. 
59. See, e.g., id. § 2.4 (“Company does not and shall not be deemed to direct or control you 
generally or in your performance under this Agreement specifically.”); id. § 13.1 (“Except as 
otherwise expressly provided herein with respect to Company acting as the limited payment 
collection agent solely for the purpose of collecting payment from Users on your behalf, the 
relationship between the parties under this agreement is solely that of independent contractors.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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to you of the Driver App and the Uber Services creates a direct 
business relationship between Company and you. Company does 
not, and shall not be deemed to, direct or control you generally 
or in your performance under this Agreement specifically, 
including in connection with your provision of Transportation 
Services, your acts or omissions, or your operation and 
maintenance of your Vehicle. You retain the sole right to 
determine when and for how long you will utilize the Driver 
App or the Uber Services.
60
 
This language reflects Uber’s awareness of the fine line between 
independent contractor and employee.
61
 Of course, a company’s 
representation that an individual is an independent contractor and not an 
employee is not the determinative factor in the independent contractor 
analysis.
62
 Rather, the facts surrounding the individual’s labor (e.g., 
hours, permanency of the relationship, skill) are determinative.
63
 
With respect to on-the-job requirements, Uber drivers are required to 
maintain their cars’ cleanliness while soliciting and giving rides.
64
 
Second, Uber requires its drivers to “maintain high standards of 
professionalism, service and courtesy.”
65
 Finally, Uber requires its 
drivers to pay operational expenses out of their own pocket.
66
 These 




The benefit for Uber drivers, however, is that they are free to choose 
their own hours.
68
 While some drivers might choose to work fulltime or 
                                                     
60. Id. § 13.1. 
61. See Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (“[T]here are a number of additional factors in the modern equation [for determining whether 
an employee is an independent contractor], including . . . the length of time for which the services 
are to be performed . . . and . . . whether the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee 
relationship.”). 
62. See, e.g., Brock v. Mr. W. Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043–44 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[F]acile 
labels and subjective factors are only relevant to the extent that they mirror ‘economic reality.’” 
(citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961))). 
63. Id. 
64. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 3.2 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
65. Id. § 3.1. 
66. Maya Kosoff, Here’s How Much Uber Drivers Are Really Earning, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 19, 
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more, others may choose to work only a few hours per week.
69
 Although 
Uber touts its drivers’ independence as a benefit of working for the 
company, failure to meet the conditions noted above to Uber’s 
satisfaction can result in a firing.
70
 Of course, because Uber considers its 
drivers independent contractors rather than employees, referring to 
driver termination as “firing” would be problematic. Thus, Uber uses a 
more palatable term: “deactivation.”
71
 Its employment agreement states 
the “[c]ompany reserves the right, at any time in the company’s sole 
discretion, to deactivate or otherwise restrict you from accessing or 




Uber’s rating system, which is the basis for many “deactivations,” 
gives riders the opportunity to grade their trip on a scale of one to five 
stars.
73
 Because there is no bright line driver rating requirement to avoid 
“deactivation,” Uber’s “deactivation” policy has left many drivers 
worried about their job security: 
Sudden firings—or in industry-speak, “deactivations”—can 
leave drivers stranded without a source of income and no legal 
recourse to fight the termination. Uber doesn’t tell drivers 
upfront what will get them canned, just [sic] sends them 
warnings once they’re already in hot water. Without a clear 
policy of what makes a fireable offense, drivers are left to piece 




Stories on these online forums are telling.
75
 Uber acknowledges that it 
“deactivates” drivers for consistently poor reviews.
76
 The fact that Uber 
                                                     
69. Hall & Kreuger, supra note 3. 
70. Abraham Riesman, We Asked 10 Black-Car Drivers If They Prefer Working for Lyft or 
Uber—Here’s Why Lyft Won by a Landslide, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 7, 2014, 8:00 PM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/12/lyft-uber-drivers.html. 
71. Id. 
72. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 3.1 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with 
author) (“Company reserves the right, at any time in Company’s sole discretion, to deactivate or 
otherwise restrict you from accessing or using the Driver App or the Uber Services if you fail to 
meet the [company] requirements.”). 
73. Riesman, supra note 70. 
74. Ellen Huet, How Uber’s Shady Firing Policy Could Backfire on the Company, FORBES (Oct. 
30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/10/30/uber-driver-firing-policy/. 
75. See What Is the Uber Process for Deactivation?, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Sept. 7, 2014), 
http://uberpeople.net/threads/what-is-the-uber-process-for-deactivation.3185/. 
76. Nairi, Feedback Is a Two-Way Street, UBER NEWSROOM (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://newsroom.uber.com/2014/04/feedback-is-a-2-way-street/ (“Have partner drivers been 
deactivated for consistently poor ratings? You bet.”). 
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dismisses drivers for poor job performance is neither surprising nor 
objectionable. Rather, the disturbing trend for drivers is that they are 
sometimes terminated without even being aware that their job 
performance is sub-standard; and thus, their job is potentially in 
jeopardy.
77
 Uber drivers have attempted to pin down exactly what the 
minimum standards for “deactivation” are, but even Uber company 
sources do not give a consistent answer.
78
 The only consensus on this 
issue is that Uber does not tolerate subpar ratings: “Many drivers [have] 
railed against Uber’s notoriously strict rating system, going so far as to 
say it makes them fear their own passengers.”
79
 
In summary, Uber drivers work in an environment with little 
certainty. Uber’s employment agreement and publicly available 
company policies on performance are vague at best. Drivers’ lack of 
consistent contact with supervisors who ultimately decide whether a 
third party’s opinion on the driver’s performance warrants firing 
compounds this vagueness. Furthermore, by virtue of not being 
designated employees, Uber drivers do not benefit from remedial labor 
statutes, and thus theoretically have no claim against Uber when drivers 
have a complaint about the nature of their workplace.
80
 
D.  Many Uber Drivers Earn Below Minimum-Wage Incomes 
Uber drivers’ exact earnings are as unclear as the circumstances of 
their workplace supervision. In Uber’s view, because of their alleged 
independent contractor status, drivers are not subject to state and federal 
wage laws, and must pay out-of-pocket for job-related expenses.
81
 
                                                     
77. See Kara Kostanich, Uber Driver Claims Working Conditions Are Unjust, KOMO NEWS (Apr. 
12, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Uber-driver-claims-working-
conditions-are-unjust-255021211.html?tab=video&c=y (referencing an interview with an Uber 
driver, Danny, the blog post states, “Danny says if you get a couple bad ratings, your job is in 
jeopardy”). 
78. Jeff Bercovici, Uber’s Ratings Terrorize Drivers and Trick Riders. Why Not Fix Them?, 
FORBES (Aug. 14, 2014, 8:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/08/14/what-are-
we-actually-rating-when-we-rate-other-people/ (asserting the lack of clarity regarding minimum 
requirements for drivers’ average ratings by comparing different minimums cited on Uber websites 
for two different cities, London and San Diego); see also How the Rating System Works, UBER S. 
FLA. (last visited Sep. 21, 2015) http://ubersouthflorida.com/how-does-the-rating-system-work/ 
(stating that a driver’s account is at risk of being deactivated when his or her average rating is below 
4.6). 
79. Reisman, supra note 70. 
80. Dan Levine & Sara McBride, Uber, Lyft, Face Critical Courtroom Test over Driver Benefits, 
REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/28/us-uber-lyft-
workers-idUSKBN0L11BN20150128. 
81. See Ben Walsh, How Uber Fails to Prove Its Drivers Make More than Taxi Drivers, 
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Indeed, because Uber does not track the expenses that drivers are 
responsible for, even Uber itself cannot know exactly what drivers earn 
after expenses.
82
 Nonetheless, a handful of available data points give 
some indication of what Uber drivers actually make.
83
 
In January 2015, Uber released a study commissioned for the 
company and conducted by Uber’s Head of Policy Research Jonathan 
Hall and former Obama administration advisor Alan Krueger.
84
 
Although any self-commissioned corporate study will elicit some 
skepticism, the study nonetheless offers a rare window into Uber 
drivers’ earnings.
85
 The highlight of the study is that Uber claims drivers 
in its six largest cities of operation earn roughly nineteen dollars per 
hour.
86
 The study finds that this is roughly fifty percent more than 
traditional taxi drivers.
87
 The study acknowledges, however, that it does 
not account for driver expenses: 
Of course, Uber’s driver-partners are not reimbursed for driving 
expenses, such as gasoline, depreciation, or insurance, while 
employed [taxi] drivers . . . may not have to cover those costs. 
These costs vary for each driver-partner, and drivers may be 
able to partially offset their costs by deducting work-related 
expenses from their income for tax purposes, including 
depreciation and/or leasing fees, gasoline, maintenance, 
insurance, mobile device and data fees, and license and 
registration fees depending on their particular tax situation. A 
detailed quantification of driver-partner costs and net after-tax 
earnings is a topic of future research. Nonetheless, the figures 
suggest that unless their after-tax costs are more than $6 per 
hour, the net hourly earnings of Uber’s driver-partners typically 




                                                     
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2015, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/uber-
drivers-pay-study_n_6527470.html (discussing flaws in Uber’s internal report regarding drivers’ 
pay). 
82. Id. (discussing the key differences between gross and net pay). 
83. See generally Hall & Krueger, supra note 3 (using limited pieces of data available to Uber 
itself, such as gross receipts, to calculate drivers’ pay). 
84. Id. 
85. See id. at 18 (giving a rough estimation of drivers’ gross pay, and the factors that Uber 
considers to determine same). 
86. Id. at 23. 
87. Id. (“Finding Uber-driver partners considered in survey made an average wage of $19.19 per 
hour, compared to the average taxi driver wage of $12.90 per hour.”). 
88. Id. 
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The study also contains data on drivers’ lifestyles and employment 
patterns. Over half of all drivers remain active Uber drivers after one 
year of driving.
89
 Moreover, thirty-eight percent of Uber drivers drive 
for Uber as their only job, compared to thirty-one percent that have a 
separate full-time job, and thirty percent that have a separate part-time 
job.
90
 Ninety-one percent of Uber drivers drive for Uber to earn 
additional income to support themselves or their family financially.
91
 
These calculations, and specifically the wage numbers, suggest that 
Uber drivers make well above minimum wage. However, many 
commentators have highlighted a number of flaws with the study.
92
 
Much of this criticism centers on the study’s variation from previous 
Uber reports on driver earnings.
93
 Specifically, three issues related to 
driver compensation continue to be problematic for the Uber labor 
model: (1) driver out-of-pocket expenses, (2) minimum-wage concerns, 
and (3) driver inability to collect tips.
94
 
First, in many places, the costs of purchasing and maintaining a 
vehicle, including gas, may exceed six dollars per hour.
95
 Reuters News 
Service has discussed one driver who claims he “spent about $150 to 
$200 per week . . . on gas, $45 per week on car washes, $100 per month 
for synthetic oil changes, plus insurance and other expenses while 
driving his 2013 Dodge Dart at least 60 hours a week in San Diego.”
96
 
These costs break down to roughly seven dollars per hour.
97
 While not 
empirically representative of average Uber drivers’ costs, these figures 
illustrate that the Uber study’s assumption that work-related driver costs 
do not exceed six dollars may not be a safe assumption.
98
 
Second, this report does not mention the considerable number of 
                                                     
89. Id. at 16. 
90. Id. at 10. 
91. Id. at 11. 
92. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 10 (highlighting flaws in assumptions that the study makes); 
Walsh, supra note 81 (highlighting flaws in values that study gives for standard driver expenses). 
93. See Griswold, supra note 10. 
94. See Walsh, supra note 81. 
95. Levine & McBride, supra note 80. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. As one commentator has noted: “The problem is that . . . [the Uber numbers] are all gross pay 
numbers, but the two sets of drivers pay out costs in different ways. Taxi drivers tend to pay leasing 
companies to use cabs maintained by medallion companies, and also pay for gas, while Uber drivers 
are responsible directly for paying and maintaining everything they need to keep their car on the 
road . . . . [W]ithout net earnings, the paper has no support for its most important claim—that Uber 
drivers earn more money than taxi drivers.” Walsh, supra note 81. 
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drivers who earn less than minimum wage according to prior data 
releases from Uber. In 2014, the company released weekly earnings data 
for its New York City drivers.
99
 According to this data, while many 
drivers make competitive hourly earnings, a considerable portion of its 
drivers make below ten dollars per hour.
100
 Other reports have 
corroborated claims that some drivers earn less than minimum wage.
101
 
While such a problem has always been a concern in the taxi industry, 
Uber’s independent contractor arrangement subjects drivers to the same 
inconsistent wages without the job security of a taxi license or 
medallion: 
For thirty minutes of work [as a taxi driver], including loading 
and unloading a passenger, a driver might earn $5—well below 
the minimum wage. But the trade-off for the relatively low pay 
was job security: stringent limits on who could pick up 
passengers and restrictions on the total number of cabs in a 




Thus, even if Uber’s data is genuine, it illustrates that while 
compensation for taxi-like services may be similar, job security for Uber 




This minimum wage issue is even more glaring in cities subject to 
higher local minimum wage requirements, which in at least one Uber 
market is as high as fifteen dollars per hour.
104
 If Uber drivers make 
                                                     
99. Andrew, What Does a Typical New York UberX Partner Earn in a Week?, UBER NEWSROOM 
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://newsroom.uber.com/nyc/2014/12/what-does-a-typical-new-york-uberx-
partner-earn-in-a-week/. 
100. Id. Ten dollars per hour is above the federal minimum wage, which provides for $7.25 per 
hour, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012), but well below other minimum wages. See SEATTLE, WASH., 
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14.19, §§ 14.19.010–.080 (2014) (mandating a fifteen-dollar per-hour 
minimum wage). 
101. Maya Kosoff, Uber Drivers Speak Out: We’re Making a Lot Less Money than Uber Is 
Telling People, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2014, 8:54 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-
drivers-say-theyre-making-less-than-minimum-wage-2014-10 (“We spoke with more than a dozen 
Uber drivers to see how much money they were making, and none of the numbers they gave were 
even close to $90,000. In fact, a few drivers said they were struggling to even earn the minimum 
wage. The drivers we spoke with say they’re making anywhere from $5 an hour to $20 an hour, 
meaning that in a year’s time, if they’re working 40-hour weeks, they could be making anywhere 
between $10,000 to $41,000.”). 
102. John Liss, Uber and the Taxi Industry’s Last Stand, THE NATION (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/uber-and-taxi-industrys-last-stand/. 
103. See supra Part I.C. 
104. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14.19, §§ 14.19.010–.080 (setting 
minimum wage to fifteen dollars per hour). 
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nineteen dollars per hour on average in Uber’s six largest markets,
105
 
factoring in expenses would presumably bring many drivers below a 
fifteen-dollar threshold. If so, Uber drivers’ potential lost wages due to 
misclassification would be considerably larger in a city such as Seattle. 
Third, Uber drivers generally do not receive tips from passengers, 
who must pay through the app.
106
 In contrast to the traditional tipping 
process for taxis, the company instructs passengers not to tip drivers.
107
 
This policy is difficult to reconcile with the company’s belief that its 
drivers are independent contractors, free to engage in business 
relationships with customers, with Uber simply providing the app that 
facilitates the relationship.
108
 If the drivers were indeed independent 




In summary, Uber drivers’ purported independent contractor status 
combined with Uber’s restrictive rating policies diminishes their 
compensation. As a function of this status, Washington statutes and 
regulations designed to guard against detrimental wage conditions do not 
apply.
110
 Broken down, data related to Uber drivers’ compensation 
suggests that many drivers have similar problems to full-fledged 
employees (e.g., less than livable wages), despite the fact that the drivers 
do not benefit from workplace protections.
111
 Moreover, other workplace 




                                                     
105. Hall & Krueger, supra note 3, at 23. 
106. Maya Kosoff, Here’s How Uber’s Tipping Policy Puts Drivers at a Disadvantage, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-tipping-policy-2014-10 
(“[I]f you’re riding in an UberX, UberBlack, or UberSUV vehicle, there’s no way to include a tip 
for your driver.”). 
107. Do I Need to Tip My Driver?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/1be144ab-609a-43c5-82b5-
b9c7de5ec073 (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). 
108. See First Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at 5, O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014), ECF No. 107, 
2014 WL 7794845. 
109. See id. 
110. See Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 159 Wash. App. 35, 42–43, 244 P.3d 32, 
41 (2010) (“[I]f the jury determined that the class members were employees and not independent 
contractors, FedEx would be liable for overtime wages under the [Minimum Wage Act].”), aff’d, 
174 Wash.2d 851, 281 P.3d 289 (2012). 
111. See Hall & Krueger, supra note 3, at 26 (finding that Uber drivers average approximately 
twenty dollars per hour in Uber’s most lucrative markets before expenses). As discussed above, 
when expenses are added to these calculations, many Uber drivers’ wages are closer to minimum 
wage levels. 
112. Walsh, supra note 81. 
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II. O’CONNOR V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES: UBER DRIVERS 
CHALLENGE THEIR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
STATUS 
Due to Uber drivers’ potential grievances, including low wages and 
no compensation for on-the-job expenses, a class of California drivers 
has sought legal recourse. In August 2013, Uber drivers filed a claim for 
violation of California wage law.
113
 Uber has thus far been unable to 
defeat the claim—Uber failed to win summary judgment and the issue 
will go to a jury.
114
 
A.  The Parties’ Arguments 
Many of the foregoing facts discussed in Part I about the work of 
Uber drivers
115
 have taken center stage in O’Connor. The drivers’ 
arguments separate into two categories: (1) Uber’s outward 
representations about the role of drivers, and (2) Uber’s internal 
treatment of drivers.
116
 Each of these are relevant to the independent 
contractor analysis in this case. 
First, with respect to outward representations, the drivers have cited 
Uber’s marketing materials as evidence of their employee status.
117
 The 
first sentence of the plaintiffs’ statement of facts in their brief opposing 
summary judgment stated, “[i]n its own words, Uber is an ‘on-demand 
car service,’ that has described itself to the public as ‘your on-demand 
private driver.’”
118
 In addition, the plaintiffs cited Uber promotional 
videos that present Uber as a transportation company, compared to 
Uber’s claim that it is a software company.
119
 For example, in one 
promotional video, Uber founder Travis Kalanick states that “the drivers 
are the lifeblood of Uber.”
120
 Accordingly, the plaintiffs claimed that this 
contradicts Uber’s contentions that it is merely a “technology” or 
                                                     
113. First Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 108, at 5.  
114. O’Connor v. Uber Techs,. Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, at *15 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 11, 2015). 
115. See supra Part II.D. 
116. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 2–8, O’Connor, 2015 WL 1069092, ECF No. 222, 2015 WL 2456295. 
117. Id. at 6–7. 
118. Id. at 2. 
119. Id. at 6. 
120. Uber: Everyone’s Private Driver, VIMEO, https://vimeo.com/58800109 (last visited May 21, 
2015) (promotional video posted to Uber’s vimeo company page); see also Plaintiffs’ Opposition to 
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 116, at 6. 
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“software” company, as alluded to in the driver operating agreements. 
The drivers assert that they could not be the “lifeblood of Uber” if Uber 
is in fact a software company.
121
 
Second, with access to voluminous company records in the discovery 
stage, the plaintiffs presented evidence of Uber personnel exerting direct 
control and supervision over drivers’ activities.
122
 For example, the 
drivers cited emails in which Uber operations and management 
employees comment, “Terrible Reviews, No second chance needed” and 
“BANNING YOUR ASS AGAIN.”
123
 Additionally, the plaintiffs noted 
that much of the training Uber drivers receive instructs drivers to ask 
passengers about their temperature and radio preferences, and in some 
cases requires that the radio be tuned to “soft jazz or NPR.”
124
 
In its motion for summary judgment, Uber’s description of the 
drivers’ work took a decidedly different tone. The motion described 
Uber’s role in the driver’s work as simply forwarding requests for 
pickups to the nearest drivers.
125
 Moreover, Uber asserted that what the 
plaintiffs refer to as direct control over the drivers’ work is instead 
merely “common-sense suggestions about how to achieve 5-star 
ratings.”
126
 Additionally, among other things, Uber cited the fact that the 
relationship is terminable at will at any time by any party, and that each 
trip Uber drivers accept is voluntary, with no penalty or repercussion if 
drivers choose simply to not perform the service.
127
 
B.  California’s Unique Borello Test 
In O’Connor, the court applied California’s unique Borello test to the 
foregoing parties’ factual arguments to determine independent contractor 
status.
128
 The test, as announced in the California State Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial 
                                                     
121. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 116, at 6. 
122. Id. at 7. 
123. Id. at 6 n.9 (emphasis in original). 
124. Id. at 5. 
125. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015), ECF No. 211. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 9 (discussing the terms of the Software License and Online Services Agreement). 
128.  O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 11, 2015). 
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 uses a two-tiered structure.
130
 It looks first to traditional 
common-law control, then to other considerations.
131
 
In Borello, the California State Supreme Court addressed whether 
migrant farmworkers were employees for California workers’ 
compensation purposes.
132
 After evaluating case law from other states 
and federal courts, the Court announced the following test.
133
 First, the 
Court reiterated the importance of the alleged employer’s right to control 
the worker’s activities on-the-job (e.g., supervision, managerial 
structure, or right to fire).
134
 Second, the Court gave some credence to 
factors beyond the right of control: 
However, the courts have long recognized that the “control” test, 
applied rigidly and in isolation, is often of little use in evaluating 
the infinite variety of service arrangements. While conceding 
that the right of control work details is the “most important” or 
“most significant” consideration, the authorities also endorse 




Looking primarily to the control that the employer exercised, the Borello 




This “tiered” test, where the “right of control” is “most important,”
137
 
is different from other jurisdictions’ independent contractor tests.
138
 
Many jurisdictions simply group the right of control factor in with 
Borello’s secondary indicia to create a test where no factor takes 
precedence over others.
139
 California, on the other hand, uses this two-
tiered test, with the first tier addressing the right of control, and the 
                                                     
129. 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). 
130. Id. at 404. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 401. 
133. Id. at 404. Note the distinction between a two-tiered and a two-step test. The Borello test 
will always address both tiers, and the first factor is never dispositive. However, the “control” factor 
is the most important part of the analysis. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 409.  
137. Id. at 404. 
138. Compare id. (using the right to control test), with Michelle M. Lasswell, Worker’s 
Compensation: Determining the Status of a Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor, 
43 DRAKE L. REV. 419, 422–24 (1994) (discussing the various other tests to determine whether an 
independent contractor is an employee). 
139. Id. 
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second tier encompassing additional factors.
140
 Although the nuance of 
each Borello factor is beyond the scope of this Comment, it bears 




C.  The O’Connor Analysis: A Victory for Drivers 
Based on this two-tiered analysis, the trial court ultimately concluded 
that Uber had not met its burden for summary judgment.
142
 The decision 
rested on two related reasons. First, the trial judge found that Uber 
drivers were “presumptively employees” under California law.
143
 The 
significance of whether an independent contractor is a “presumptive 
employee” under California law is primarily procedural, as opposed to 
substantive.
144
 In general, once a worker shows that a service has been 
provided to the alleged employer, the presumption applies and the 




Second, moving to the merits, the trial court began by addressing 
                                                     
140. See, e.g., Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. 
141. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 11, 2015). Drawing on Borello, the O’Connor court listed the following as the thirteen factors: 
(1) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
(2) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done  
under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; 
(3) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(4) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of 
work for the person doing the work; 
(5) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; 
(6) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(7) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; 
(8) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee; 
(9) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; 
(10) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his 
employment of helpers; 
(11) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 
(12) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; 
(13) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. 
Id. For a detailed explanation of how independent contractor tests became so large and unruly, see 
Carlson, supra note 12, at 351. 
142. O’Connor, 2015 WL 1069092, at *6. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. 
145. Id.; see also Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that once a 
worker shows he provided a service “the burden shifts to the employer, which may prove, if it can, 
that the presumed employee was an independent contractor”). 
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Uber’s assertion that it does not directly supervise its drivers, which goes 
to the alleged employer’s level of control.
146
 Although acknowledging 
that Uber does not directly supervise its drivers, Uber’s propensity to 
“deactivate” drivers that do not comply with specific standards appears 
to be a form of indirect but significant supervision over employee 
conduct.
147
 The court went on to acknowledge that Uber drivers’ 
personal control over their own hours could evince independent 
contractor status.
148
 However, the court was more concerned about the 
level of control Uber exercised while drivers were on the job: 
The more relevant inquiry is how much control Uber has over its 
drivers while they are on duty for Uber. The fact that some 
drivers are only on-duty irregularly says little about the level of 
control Uber can exercise over them when they do report to 
work. Indeed, and as noted above, [courts interpreting California 
law have] recognized this precise distinction in earlier cases 
where hirees who were “not required to work either at all or on 
any particular schedule” were nonetheless held to be employees 
as a matter of law based on the amount of control the employer 




Summarizing these two justifications, the court found that the right of 
control factor, or “primary” Borello factor, did not warrant summary 
judgment.
150
 With respect to the secondary Borello factors, the court 
noted that some factors, such as drivers providing their own vehicles, 
indicated an independent contractor relationship, while others, such as 
the drivers forming “an integral part of Uber’s business” favored an 
employment relationship.
151
 By analogy, the O’Connor trial court’s 
analysis gives some insight into whether Uber drivers may be classified 
as independent contractors under Washington law, which uses a slightly 
different analysis. 
                                                     
146. O’Connor, 2015 WL 1069092, at *13. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at *14. 
149. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 142 Cal. 
App. 4th 1046, 1051 (2006)). 
150. Id. at *15. 
151. Id. 
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III.  WASHINGTON DOCTRINES: “RIGHT OF CONTROL” 
VERSUS “ECONOMIC REALITIES” 
Courts have developed a litany of tests to delineate the bounds 
between independent contractors and employees. For example, a claim 
involving vicarious liability for tort purposes would implicate a different 
test than an employee asserting employee status for wage purposes.
152
 In 
contrast, a claim involving wage or workers’ compensation, such as 




A.  Washington’s Iteration of the Traditional “Right of Control” Test 
Traditionally, Washington courts have used a “right of control” test to 
evaluate whether a business relationship is in fact an employee-employer 
relationship.
154
 This test evaluates the extent to which an employer 
controlled the actions of persons performing work for the business.
155
 
Though similar to the Borello test, it does not “tier” any factors, and 
instead uses the following equally weighted factors: 
(a)  the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master 
may exercise over the details of the work; 
(b)  whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
(c)  the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d)  the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 
doing the work; 
(f)  the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g)  the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h)  whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of 
the employer; 
(i)  whether or not the parties believe they are creating the 
                                                     
152. See Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 871, 281 P.3d 289, 
297 (2012) (explaining the various applications of independent contractor tests). 
153. See id. (holding that the “economic realities” test applies to wage disputes). 
154. See, e.g., Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 147 Wash. 2d 114, 119–21, 52 P.3d 472, 474–76 
(2002) (using the right to control test to evaluate a misclassification claim). 
155. Id. 
13 - Ross.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/13/2015  2:41 PM 
1452 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1431 
 
relation of master and servant; and 
(j)  whether the principal is or is not in business.
156
 
In theory, if these factors tilt in favor of an employer-employee 
relationship, it follows that the employer should be liable for the tortious 
conduct of an employee.
157
 
The origins of this test go back centuries.
158
 With the advent of the 
industrial economy, employers were able to exercise increased control 
over the conduct of their employees: “[I]ntegrated enterprise demanded 
a large number of employees and the larger enterprise needed a high 
degree of control and predictability which they could get with employees 
but which was not possible in commercial relationships with individual 
entrepreneurs.”
159




The Washington State Supreme Court’s seminal case on the “right of 
control” test, Hollingberry v. Dunn,
161
 gives a guiding example of how a 
court might apply this test.
162
 In Hollingberry, an automobile collided 
with three horses that escaped from a nearby farm, which resulted in the 
death of a passenger.
163
 The farm owner had contracted with a worker to 
seed an area surrounding a fence for a horse enclosure.
164
 The critical 
facts were that (1) the farm worker used his own equipment, (2) used his 
own methods of planting seeds, (3) both parties acknowledged that the 
worker had superior seeding knowledge, and (4) the parties did not agree 
to any fixed level of compensation.
165
 Despite the farm owner’s 
instructions, the worker forgot to completely enclose the fence after a 
day’s work, and the horses escaped.
166
 The farm owner voluntarily 
settled with the decedent’s estate, and brought a claim seeking 
                                                     
156. Hollingberry v. Dunn, 68 Wash. 2d 75, 80–81, 411 P.2d 431, 435 (1966) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958)) (holding that, based on these factors, a sodding 
contractor was not an employee). 
157. See id. 
158. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 14 (1765) (explaining that those who hire 
workers as “servants” should be held liable for those “servants’” actions). 
159. John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose Is Not Always a 
Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 337, 340 (1991). 
160. Id. 
161. 68 Wash. 2d 75, 411 P.2d 431 (1966). 
162. Id. at 81, 411 P.2d at 435. 
163. Id. at 76, 411 P.2d at 431. 
164. Id. at 78, 411 P.2d at 432–34. 
165. Id.  
166. Id.  
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indemnification from the farm worker for negligence.
167
 The Court held 
that the worker was an independent contractor, rather than an employee, 
and thus the worker could not indemnify the farm owner.
168
 In its 
reasoning, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, noting that 
substantial evidence supported a finding that the “right of control” 
factors supported the independent contractor designation.
169
 
The “right of control” test in American jurisprudence can be traced 
back nearly 200 years.
170
 Antiquated nomenclature such as “master” and 
“servant” often accompany the test.
171
 The test is particularly unsuitable 
for the modern employment law environment, which is governed 
primarily by statute, and where the primary concerns are workplace 
protections, such as a guaranteed minimum wage.
172
 
Courts and commentators alike have criticized this test as unwieldy 
and unpredictable.
173
 Because it uses ten different factors, the test can 
lead to wildly different results.
174
 Moreover, as one commentator aptly 
notes, America’s transition from industrial to a service-based economy 
presents serious, potentially insurmountable, challenges to the traditional 
test.
175
 Industrial jobs raise more concerns about employee welfare in the 
workplace, and tests for independent contractors should reflect that.
176
 
B.  The FedEx Saga and Modern Considerations 
The need for a test that fits with modern realities of the workplace, 
                                                     
167. Id. at 76, 411 P.2d at 431. 
168. Id. at 82, 411 P.2d at 435. 
169. Id. 
170. See, e.g., Inhabitants of Lowell v. Boston & L.R. Corp., 40 Mass. 24, 33 (1839) (giving a 
“right to control” independent contractor analysis). 
171. See, e.g., id. (“If a servant, in obedience to the command of his master, commits a trespass 
upon the property of another, not knowing that he is doing any injury, he is nevertheless answerable 
for the tort as well as his master, to the party injured; yet he is entitled to an action against his 
master for the damages he may suffer, although the master also was ignorant, that the act 
commanded was unlawful; because he is deemed the principal offender.”). 
172. See Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 869–70, 281 P.3d 
289, 297 (2012) (explaining the different purposes of the right to control and economic realities 
tests). 
173. See, e.g., Susan Schwochau, Identifying an Independent Contractor for Tax Purposes: Can 
Clarity and Fairness Be Achieved?, 84 IOWA L. REV. 163, 180–81 (1998) (“Courts’ determinations 
have been criticized for being based on only one or two factors . . . . The result is a ‘test’ in which 
neither the factors nor their weights can be predicted.” (internal citations omitted)). 
174. Id. 
175. See Bruntz, supra note 159, at 340–41 (explaining the evolution of independent contractor 
law in the context of economic and industrial transitions). 
176. See id. 
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such as wage and occupational health issues, is only growing; 
independent contractors are becoming a larger portion of the American 
labor force.
177
 This deficiency has resulted in extensive litigation. One 
notable example involves dozens of lawsuits brought by FedEx Ground 
delivery drivers alleging that the company misclassified them as 
independent contractors and therefore owed back pay and 
reimbursement for various job-related expenses.
178
 FedEx Ground uses 
approximately 4000 drivers nationwide, all of whom it classifies as 
independent contractors.
179
 The drivers have sued in a variety of contexts 
and jurisdictions; thus, the tests and their application are varied.
180
 The 
FedEx saga is representative of the impact litigation has in shaping 
independent contractor law across the country 
For example, in FedEx Home Delivery v. National Labor Relations 
Board,
181
 FedEx refused to negotiate with duly elected union 
representatives because the workers were independent contractors and 
thus could not organize.
182
 In short, FedEx claimed that it used 
independent contractors to drive its delivery trucks.
183
 FedEx assigned 
the drivers a route, and the drivers had to complete the route on their 
own time before a specified deadline.
184
 The National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) ruled against FedEx in an administrative adjudication, 
and FedEx appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
185
 Applying the “right of 
control” test,
186
 the D.C. Circuit judges overruled the NLRB, holding 
that the delivery drivers were independent contractors.
187
 The facts 
                                                     
177. Joshua Wright, Data Spotlight: Independent Contractors on the Rise, EMSI (Apr. 29, 2011), 
http://www.economicmodeling.com/2011/04/29/independent-contractors-other-noncovered-
workers-on-the-rise/. 
178. See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 686 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2012); Huggins v. FedEx Ground 
Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2010); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 
(D.C. Cir. 2009); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010). 
179. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 495 (discussing FedEx’s delivery workforce). 
180. Compare id. (collective bargaining), with Craig, 686 F.3d 423 (wages). 
181. 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 




186. The majority gave an interesting take on the modern application of the “right of control” 
test, noting that “[f]or a time, when applying this common law test, we spoke in terms of an 
employer’s right to exercise control, making the extent of actual supervision of the means and 
manner of the worker’s performance a key consideration,” but over time the court recognized that 
“some controls were more equal than others.” Id. at 496–97 (emphasis added). 
187. Id. at 504. 
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showed that FedEx did not control the amount that drivers worked, did 
not prescribe the specific hours during which they would work, and the 
workers could even sell their own assigned routes to other drivers.
188
 
The majority reasoned that the drivers therefore retained 
“entrepreneurial opportunity.”
189
 This, according to the majority, 
conformed to “right of control” precedent that emphasized 
“entrepreneurial opportunity” as evidence that workers were 
independent contractors.
190
 In reaching a different conclusion, an 
impassioned dissent rejected this “entrepreneurial opportunity” take on 
the “right of control” test, and called for adherence to the traditional 
“right of control” factors.
191
 
Other courts ruling on this FedEx saga have echoed the dissent’s 
view. In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,
192
 the Ninth 
Circuit found that drivers who worked in a capacity similar to the 
workers in FedEx Home Delivery qualified as employees under the 
“right of control” test.
193
 The factual circumstances in Alexander 
deviated in three critical areas: (1) drivers were generally assigned 
workloads that led to, at a minimum, nine-hour workdays; (2) drivers 
were required to wear company uniforms; and (3) FedEx instructed the 
drivers to act cordially toward customers.
194
 In light of these factual 
differences, the court stressed that FedEx controlled the “manner and 
means” of employment, which it held to be the most important factor in 
the “right of control” analysis. 
These two cases, and the litany of other FedEx independent contractor 
disputes, give a representative example of the issues that are most 
relevant to the “right of control” test.
195
 While Hollingberry sets out the 
relevant factors, the FedEx cases give a glimpse of the factual 
considerations at play in misclassification cases. A successful outcome 
for Uber drivers in O’Connor could spark litigation in other states, 
similar to that of the FedEx saga. Any such outbreak of Uber 
                                                     
188. Id. at 499–500. 
189. Id. at 500. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 517 (Garland, J., dissenting). 
192. 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014). 
193. Id. at 997. 
194. Id. at 985. 
195. See, e.g., id.; Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 686 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2010); FedEx Home Delivery, 
563 F.3d 492; In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010). These 
cases all addressed nearly identical misclassification claims by FedEx delivery drivers. 
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independent contractor cases would presumably result in a variety of 
analyses similar to that of the FedEx cases, with potentially different 
outcomes due to subtle differences in jurisdictions’ tests.
196
 A line of 
Uber cases could lead to a similar result. 
C.  Anfinson: The Washington State Supreme Court Forges a New 
Path 
The “right of control” and the California Borello test are not the only 
tests courts use for determining independent contractor relationships;
197
 
some courts have elected to use an “economic realities” test.
198
 While 
related, this test departs from the “right of control” test in critical areas. 
Most notably, it focuses on the wage and dependency of the worker on 
the alleged employer instead of looking primarily at control.
199
 These 
differences make the “economic realities” test better suited for 
determining independent contractor status when wage and workplace 
protection statutes are at issue, rather than liability concerns.
200
 
The United States Supreme Court first established the “economic 
realities” test in Bartels v. Birmingham.
201
 In that case, the Court 
analyzed whether members of bands recruited by headlining singers 
were employees, for purposes of social security, of the concert venues in 
which they played.
202
 In determining the band members were not 
employees, the Court cited the worker-protection purposes underlying 
the applicable statute as its reason for departing from the “right of 
control” test: “Obviously control is characteristically associated with the 
employer-employee relationship but in the application of social 
legislation employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are 
dependent upon the business to which they render service.”
203
 The Court 
                                                     
196. Id. 
197. See Deanne M. Mosley & William C. Walter, The Significance of the Classification of 
Employment Relationships in Determining Exposure to Liability, 67 MISS. L.J. 613, 631–32 (1998) 
(discussing the three independent contractor tests federal courts use in civil rights contexts: (1) the 
“right of control “ test, (2) the “economic realities” test, and (3) a “hybrid” test). 
198. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law Regulation of 
Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 671 (1996).  
199. See id. at 667. 
200. See Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 870, 281 P.3d 289, 
297 (2012) (highlighting the economic realities test’s more effective application when addressing 
wage concerns). 
201. 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947). 
202. Id. at 127–28. 
203. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
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listed the following factors that guide this analysis in addition to whether 
the employer exercises control over the worker: (1) the permanency of 
the arrangement, (2) the level of skill required, (3) the investment in the 
facilities and materials for work, and (4) opportunities for profit or 
loss.
204
 Taking a holistic approach to this test, the Court noted that “[i]t 
is the total situation that controls.”
205
 
The Washington State Supreme Court has recently adopted an 
iteration of this test for determining whether an employee is an 
independent contractor under wage statutes.
206
 In Anfinson v. FedEx 
Ground Package System, Inc., Washington FedEx drivers brought a 
claim in state court alleging violations of the Washington Minimum 
Wage Act (MWA) and, as a corollary, the Federal Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA).
207
 The MWA guarantees a minimum wage tied to inflation for 
all employees, and not independent contractors, in Washington.
208
 
Moreover, the statute states that employees are entitled to 150 percent 
pay for overtime work,
209
 requires employers to maintain certain wage 
records,
210
 and creates a statutory cause of action for workers paid less 
than the MWA’s requirements.
211
 Although beyond the scope of this 
Comment, the FLSA is the federal analogue for the MWA.
212
 
In Anfinson, a class of FedEx drivers argued that FedEx misclassified 
them as independent contractors.
213
 They sought back pay for overtime 
hours worked under the MWA and compensation for required uniforms 
under the Washington Industrial Welfare Act.
214
 Determining which test 
for independent contractors applied in Washington for the purposes of 
                                                     
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 871, 281 P.3d 289, 297–
98 (2012). 
207. 159 Wash. App. 35, 42–43, 244 P.3d 32, 35–36 (2010), aff’d, 174 Wash. 2d 851, 281 P.3d 
189. 
208. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.020 (2014) (guaranteeing a minimum wage for employees, 
but not contractors). 
209. Id. § 49.46.130(1). 
210. Id. § 49.46.070. 
211. Id. § 49.46.090. In addition to the MWA, Washington law includes a number of other 
remedial labor statutes intended to protect the rights of workers, including the Industrial Welfare 
Act (IWA), id §§ 49.12.005–.903, and the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 
(WISHA), id. §§ 49.17.010–.910.  
212. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 868, 281 P.3d 289, 295–
97 (2012). 
213. Anfinson, 159 Wash. App. 35, 42–43, 244 P.3d 32, 35–36 (2010), aff’d, 174 Wash. 2d 851, 
281 P.3d 189. 
214. Id. at 42–43, 244 P.3d at 35–36. 
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wage statutes was a matter of first impression for the Court.
215
 At trial, 
the judge instructed the jury that the FedEx drivers were employees if 
FedEx had the “right of control” over the drivers.
216
 Citing the federal 
trend of using the “economic realities” test for FLSA purposes, the court 
of appeals overturned this instruction, adopting the “economic realities” 
test.
217
 This set the stage for the Washington State Supreme Court to 
guide this matter of first impression. 
The majority of the Court agreed with the court of appeals that the 
“economic realities” test was the proper analysis.
218
 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Owens gave a thorough analysis of the independent 
contractor law landscape.
219
 First, as the court of appeals noted, the 
MWA and FLSA both are intended to protect workers.
220
 Moreover, 
Congress enacted the MWA at a time when federal courts, as evidenced 
by Bartels, already used the “economic realities” inquiry for determining 
independent contractor status under the FLSA.
221
 
Second, the majority invoked the Washington remedial statute canon 
of interpretation.
222
 Washington courts interpret remedial statutes 
liberally and construe any exemptions from such statutes narrowly.
223
 
This canon has been invoked in previous wage cases; in doing so, the 
Court has noted that “Washington [has a] long and proud history of 
being a pioneer in the protection of employee rights.”
224
 The Anfinson 
majority’s application of the remedial statute canon fits with this line of 
reasoning. Because it focuses on the economic well-being of the worker 
rather than the employer’s control, many consider the “economic 
realities” test to be a more progressive framework.
225
 
Finally, the Court distinguished between the “right of control” and 
“economic realities” tests. Specifically, the MWA and common law 
vicarious liability are means to two very different ends
226
: 
                                                     
215. Id. at 41, 244 P.3d at 34–35. 
216. Id. at 47, 244 P.3d at 38. 
217. Id. at 53–54, 244 P.3d at 41–42; Anfinson 174 Wash. 2d 851, 281 P.3d 289. 
218. Anfinson, 174 Wash. 2d at 871, 281 P.3d at 297–98. 
219. See id. at 868–71, 281 P.3d at 297–98. 
220. Id. at 869–70, 281 P.3d at 297–98. 
221. Id.  
222. See id. at 870, 281 P.3d at 298. 
223. Id.  
224. Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wash. 2d 291, 300, 996 P.2d 582, 586–87 
(2000). 
225. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 12, at 323 (discussing the potential for the economic realities 
test to be slightly more worker-friendly than other tests). 
226. Anfinson, 174 Wash. 2d at 870, 281 P.3d at 297–98. 
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[C]onsideration of the contrasting purposes of vicarious 
liability—to which the right-to-control test set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 applies—and the MWA 
bolsters our rejection of the right-to-control test. The right-to-
control test serves to limit an employer’s liability for the torts of 
another. By contrast, minimum wage laws have a remedial 
purpose of protecting against “the evils and dangers resulting 
from wages too low to buy the bare necessities of life and from 
long hours of work injurious to health.”
227
 
This reasoning is where Washington’s independent contractor law 
regarding vicarious liability, such as that applied in Hollingberry, 
diverges from wage-related independent contractor claims. On the 
vicarious liability prong, the “right of control” test controls.
228
 On the 
wage-disputes prong, the “economic realities” test controls.
229
 
While making clear that the “economic realities” test is the proper test 
for wage-based independent contractor suits in Washington, the 
Anfinson opinion does not explicitly establish what factors comprise the 
test.
230
 The majority cites two different tests as examples of the 
“economic realities” test, but does not state which of these tests it wishes 
to adopt.
231
 Some federal courts use a five-factor “economic realities” 
test: 
To aid us in this task, we consider five factors: the degree of 
control exercised by the alleged employer; the extent of the 
relative investments of the worker and alleged employer; the 
degree to which the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss is 
determined by the alleged employer; the skill and initiative 




Other federal circuits have tacked on a sixth factor that asks “whether 
the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s 
business.”
233
 By explicitly citing two slightly different iterations of the 
“economic realities” test, the Court did not settle what precise factors 
apply to the test under Washington law. 
                                                     
227. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361 (1945)). 
228. Hollingberry v. Dunn, 68 Wash. 2d 75, 82, 411 P.2d 431, 436 (1966). 
229. Anfinson, 174 Wash. 2d at 871, 281 P.3d at 297–98. 
230. Id. at 869, 281 P.3d at 296. 
231. Id.  
232. See, e.g., Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 
1998) (citing Reich v. Circle C Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
233. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979). 
13 - Ross.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/13/2015  2:41 PM 
1460 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1431 
 
Two justices disagreed with this analysis in Anfinson.
234
 In his dissent, 
Justice Charles Johnson rejected the majority’s adoption of the 
“economic realities” test as “unworkable.”
235
 He reasoned that by 
evaluating the worker’s financial dependency on the employer, the test 
could cover virtually all independent contractors: “the plaintiff drivers 
are dependent on FedEx for their livelihood. But so too is the painting 
subcontractor dependent on the builder, the tire manufacturer on General 
Motors, the aviation electronics firm on Boeing, and so on.”
236
 
Though Justice Johnson’s prediction could be accurate in theory, his 
analysis ignores that the “economic realities” test adopted by the 
majority is more nuanced than mere financial dependence. Indeed, 
financial dependence is central to the inquiry, but the test implicates at 
least five factors separate from simple financial dependence.
237
 It seems 
doubtful Anfinson will spell the end of independent contractors in 
Washington as the dissent seems to suggest that it will,
238
 particularly in 
light of the aforementioned growth of independent contractors.
239
 
IV.  APPLYING THE LESSONS OF O’CONNOR: QUESTIONING 
THE VIABILITY OF THE UBER LABOR MODEL IN 
WASHINGTON 
Uber drivers have already brought class action suits in courts outside 
of Washington.
240
 For example, in O’Connor, drivers are currently 
pursuing wage and gratuities claims under California state labor 
statutes.
241
 The outcome of the case will turn on whether they can 
qualify as employees under California law.
242
 In contrast to the Anfinson 
test used in Washington, California courts use the two-tiered Borello test 
for wage independent contractor analyses.
243
 Although similar, the 
                                                     
234. Anfinson, 174 Wash. 2d at 878, 281 P.3d at 303 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
235. Id.  
236. Id. at 882, 281 P.3d at 304. 
237. Id. at 869, 281 P.3d at 296–97 (majority opinion). 
238. Id. at 882, 281 P.3d at 304 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
239. See Wright, supra note 4. 
240. See generally Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL 4742878 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013), ECF No. 58. 
241. See id. at *5. 
242. See id. 
243. See, e.g., Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(“The essence of the test is the ‘control of details’—that is, whether the principal has the right of 
control the manner and means by which the worker accomplishes the work—but there are a number 
of additional factors in the modern equation, including (1) whether the worker is engaged in a 
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Anfinson test has a decidedly different character: It does not give extra 
weight to a single factor in the way the Borello test favors the “right of 
control” factor over others.
244
 
Thus, while a legal analysis of Uber drivers’ independent contractor 
status in Washington would be different from the O’Connor analysis, the 
lessons from O’Connor could be predictive of the facts and 
interpretations that would be relevant to a similar analysis under 
Washington law. Because the Anfinson Court gave a decidedly worker-
friendly commentary on the test for independent contractors, O’Connor 
suggests that Uber’s independent contractor labor model may not be 
viable in Washington. 
A.  Courts Using the “Economic Realities” Test Apply It as a Worker-
Friendly Analysis 
Courts’ progressive tone when discussing the “economic realities” 
test is instructive for how Uber drivers’ potential claims may be 
resolved.
245
 Because Washington’s adoption of the “economic realities” 
test is rather recent, it is instructive that federal courts have consistently 
found the “economic realities” test to be a particularly liberal analysis.
246
 
For example, in Doty v. Elias,
247
 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
heard a case brought by restaurant employees alleging misclassification 
as independent contractors for wage purposes.
248
 In that case, the 
defendant stressed the fact that the plaintiffs could pick the hours they 
worked (during the restaurant’s open hours).
249
 Despite this near 
                                                     
distinct occupation or business, (2) whether, considering the kind of occupation and locality, the 
work is usually done under the principal’s direction or by a specialist without supervision, (3) the 
skill required, (4) whether the principal or worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and place of 
work, (5) the length of time for which the services are to be performed, (6) the method of payment, 
whether by time or by job, (7) whether the work is part of the principal’s regular business, and (8) 
whether the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship.”). Notably, 
California’s minimum wage statute was passed prior to the FLSA, and thus state courts have not 
given weight to the federal courts’ use of the “economic realities” test for wage-based independent 
contractor disputes. See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 270 (Cal. 2010) (refusing to apply the 
economic realities test given that the relevant California statute preceded the FLSA). 
244. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 869, 281 P.3d 289, 296 
(2012). 
245. See, e.g., Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1984) (discussing the “economic 
reality” test’s friendliness for workers). 
246. See, e.g., EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983); Hickey v. Arkla Indus., 
699 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1983). 
247. 733 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1984). 
248. Id. at 722. 
249. Id. at 723. 
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complete autonomy over hours, the court cited the fact that the majority 
of plaintiffs were wholly dependent on working at the restaurant to make 
a living wage.
250
 Since Doty, some have characterized this decision as 
evidence of the “economic realities” test’s worker-friendliness.
251
 At 
bottom, the critical threshold for plaintiffs is whether they can show that 
they depend on the work for their livelihood, which encompasses a vast 
number of independent contractors.
252
 
In light of the test’s worker-friendly tilt, independent contractors who 
claim they are misclassified will always have a head-start in their efforts 
to persuade a court that they are in fact employees.
253
 This is in line with 
the Washington State Supreme Court’s remedial statute interpretation 
canon discussed above.
254
 Thus, Uber drivers will generally have a 
greater chance at success under the “economic realities” test. 
B. The “Economic Realities” Factors Suggest Uber Drivers Qualify 
as Employees Rather Than Independent Contractors 
The primary requirement in Washington for gaining employee status 
for MWA purposes is demonstrating that the six “economic realities” 
factors favor employee designation.
255
 This inquiry is fact intensive.
256
 
At each stage of the analysis, the economic dependence of the Uber 




1. Uber’s Right of Control 
The first factor in the economic realities test judges the “degree of 
control” that the employer can exercise over the worker.
258
 As discussed 
                                                     
250. Id. 
251. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 270–71 (10th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that the 
economic realities test is inherently geared toward protecting workers). 
252. See Doty, 733 F.2d at 723. 
253. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 270–71 (discussing one interpretation of the FLSA-independent 
contractor definition as a “liberal definition”). 
254. See generally Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 281 P.3d 
289 (2012). 
255. Id. at 869, 281 P.3d at 298. 
256. Id.  
257. Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that 
economic dependence of drivers is the foundation for the entire “economic realities” analysis). 
258. See Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 
1998) (citing Reich v. Circle C Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993) (listing “control” as 
the first factor within the economic realities test)). 
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above, this is the carryover factor from the earlier common law test.
259
 
Since Anfinson, only one court has conducted a thorough analysis of the 
economic realities factors. In Moba v. Total Transportation Services 
Inc.,
260
 a federal district court applying Washington law ruled that based 
on language in a contract guaranteeing that freight drivers were not 
obliged to work at any certain time and authorizing drivers to work for 




Moba’s analysis overemphasizes the significance of formalities at the 
expense of realities. When evaluating this factor, courts should not look 
to the contract’s language as definitive evidence of control.
262
 If contract 
language were dispositive, any company that seeks to treat workers as 
independent contractors could simply write contract terms that seem to 
bar the company from controlling the workers, and then exert control in 
practice despite those terms. Instead, courts should look to how the labor 
scheme works in practice to determine whether the company does in fact 
exert control over the workers; as the Fifth Circuit has noted, “[i]t is not 
significant how one ‘could have’ acted under the contract terms. The 
controlling realities are reflected by the way one actually acts.”
263
 
Looking at Uber drivers’ practical circumstances, Uber does exert 
some pressure in dictating how drivers do their job. First, as discussed 
above, Uber uses a surge pricing model that creates zones where drivers 
have a temporary financial incentive to serve because of high demand in 
that area.
264
 Second, the company effectively requires a significant level 
of courtesy on the job because of its strict “deactivation” policy.
265
 
Third, the discussion in O’Connor about the subtle instructions that Uber 
gives its drivers, such as suggesting the radio be tuned a certain way or 
the air conditioning properly monitored, cuts in favor of the drivers on 
this factor.
266
 Of course, there are periods when Uber drivers are alone in 
their vehicle on the job, without direct supervision. Thus, the outcome 
                                                     
259. See supra Part III. 
260. 16 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
261. Id. at 1264. 
262. See Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that 
the primary focus of the control factor is the interaction and relationship between the parties, not 
nomenclature). 
263. Id. (quoting Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
264. Kedmey, supra note 23. 
265. Riesman, supra note 70. 
266. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 116, at 5. 
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on this factor is by no means absolute. In summary, Uber rarely, if at all, 
exercises direct control (e.g., face to face) over its drivers. However, it 
does use secondary methods of control, such as supervising ratings and 
encouraging consistent habits, to exert some control over drivers’ on-
the-job conduct. 
2.  Drivers’ Opportunity for Profit or Loss 
The “opportunity for profit or loss” factor turns on the extent to which 
an individual’s level of performance on the job can increase or decrease 
one’s financial success.
267
 For example, if highly skilled individuals can 
make comparatively large amounts of money based on those skills, the 
arrangement would tilt toward an independent contractor relationship.
268
 
By contrast, if all alleged employees’ compensation is similarly 
proportional to the amount of labor performed, the circumstances 




Uber drivers seemingly have little opportunity for exceptional profit 
or loss. According to one court evaluating this factor in the context of 
delivery drivers, when “experienced drivers knew which jobs were most 
profitable,” the “profit or loss” factor tilted in favor of independent 
contractor status.
270
 Such is not the case with Uber: Uber’s own data 
suggests that the drivers who work the most hours per week—
presumably the most experienced—do not, on an hourly basis, earn 
much more than infrequent drivers.
271
 Uber drivers’ opportunity for 
profit based on superior skill is negligible at best, which favors 
employee designation. 
3.  Drivers’ Investment in Required Equipment or Materials 
The “investment” factor relates to the “profit or loss” factor.
272
 The 
touchstone of this factor is as follows: 
If the worker supplies more of the tools and materials for the 
                                                     
267. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1536 (7th Cir. 1987) (analyzing 
farmworkers’ opportunity for profit or loss under the economic realities test). 
268. See id. 
269. See id. 
270. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1998). 
271. See Hall & Kreuger, supra note 3, at 18 (showing that Uber drivers’ compensation does not 
increase as they work more hours). 
272. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1537 (discussing farmworkers’ investment in their gear and 
tools). 
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work, for instance, the worker’s investment increases, she is 
exposed to greater risk of loss or opportunity for profit, and it 
becomes more likely that she is an independent contractor. An 
employee, by contrast, brings only his personal services to the 




Of course, independent contractors often bring their own materials to 
jobs. Courts have not established a clear threshold that alleged 
employees must meet to tip this factor in their favor.
274
 Courts have, 
however, reasoned that “[w]hen an employer furnishes valuable 
equipment, an employment relationship almost invariably exists.”
275
 
This expansive reading fits with the economic dependence “lens” that 
courts often use when evaluating these factors.
276
 
Driving for Uber requires two essential tools: an app and a car. Uber 
provides drivers with the tool most important to their job: the Uber 
app.
277
 Although Uber’s business model depends principally on the app, 
Uber drivers have the option of supplying their own vehicles and 
smartphones or their own vehicle and smartphone.
278
 These 
considerations make the “investment” factor with respect to Uber drivers 
rather even. 
4.  Whether the Service Requires a “Special Skill” 
Uber drivers follow their phones’ directions, pick customers up, and 
drop them off.
279
 One could perhaps make extra money by having 
knowledge of popular areas to request rides. However, the occupation 
does not require a special skill.
280
 In O’Connor, Uber attempted to make 
the argument that drivers can significantly affect their earnings by using 
expertise or skillful techniques.
281
 Even so, if giving rides to customers 
                                                     
273. Carlson, supra note 12, at 351. 
274. Id. 
275. See, e.g., Potter v. Mont. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 853 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Mont. 1993) (citing 
Solheim v. Tom Davis Ranch, 677 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Mont. 1993)). 
276. See supra Part IV.B. 
277. See Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
278. Id. 
279. See Vaughn, supra note 20. 
280. Compare FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 500–01 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (delivery 
driving), with Hollingberry v. Dunn, 68 Wash. 2d 75, 78, 411 P.2d 431, 432 (1966) (seeding). 
281. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, supra note 125, at 4. 
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for money requires a special skill for the purposes of this test, it is hard 
to imagine what forms of labor would not require a special skill.
282
 
Indeed, part of the appeal of becoming an Uber driver is that anyone 
who knows how to drive can make money by working as a driver. 
Dissimilarly, at least one federal court has found that delivery drivers 
can qualify as independent contractors.
283
 In FedEx Home Delivery, the 
D.C. Circuit ruled that FedEx drivers who had to take a short course in 
delivery driving could qualify as specially skilled employees.
284
 Thus, 
while Uber driving may not seem like an especially “skilled” profession, 
facts may support both sides of this factor. Contrast Uber drivers with 
the relationship in Hollingberry, which the parties entered into because 
the worker was particularly knowledgeable in “seeding,” a bona-fide 
specialty.
285
 In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that welding, which is 
a decidedly skilled profession, is the type of “special skill” that this 
factor contemplates.
286
 If an activity as common as driving a car 
qualifies as a special skill, it is difficult to imagine what would not 
qualify as a special skill. Accordingly, driving for Uber should not 
require a particularly special skill. 
5. Permanence of the Relationship 
Although Uber’s driving contracts specify that the relationship is 
terminable at will,
287
 the relationship is nevertheless more permanent 
than the traditional conception of independent contractor 
relationships.
288
 Consider, for example, the Hollingberry arrangement in 
which the seeder contracted to complete a discrete job: seeding an 
enclosed area.
289
 In contrast, Uber drivers work with no defined end. Of 
course, Uber drivers are free to stop driving whenever they choose.
290
 
                                                     
282. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 116, at 25 (highlighting the very few opportunities that drivers have to make 
profits above the average driver).  
283. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 500–01 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
284. Id. 
285. Hollingberry, 68 Wash. 2d at 78, 411 P.2d at 432. 
286. Carrell v. Sunland Constr., Inc., 998 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1993). 
287. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 2.4 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
288. See, e.g., Hollingberry, 68 Wash. 2d at 78, 411 P.2d at 432 (holding that a sodding employee 
tasked with a single job did not have a particularly permanent relationship with the other party). 
289. Id., 411 P.2d at 433. 
290. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 2.5 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
13 - Ross.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/13/2015  2:41 PM 
2015] RIDESHARING’S HOUSE OF CARDS 1467 
 
Under the language of the contract, there is no guaranteed employment 
period.
291
 Thus, although Uber drivers have an immediately severable 
relationship with Uber, the fact that the arrangement is for an indefinite 
period makes the resolution of this factor non-absolute. 
6. Whether the Service Rendered Is an Integral Part of the Business 
The final factor evaluates the importance of workers to the alleged 
employer’s business. In some instances, courts have found employees 
who, at first glance, are not crucial to a business’s livelihood are 
nevertheless an integral part of the business. In Dole v. Snell,
292
 a cake 
business’s decorators challenged their designation as independent 
contractors.
293
 The court, citing the very name of the business, “Cakes 




Uber would not exist without drivers. Although the company touts 
itself as a “technology company,” it earns revenue from its drivers 
giving a portion of their fares to Uber.
295
 Consider the company’s own 
slogan. When users open the Uber app, they see the words “[e]veryone’s 
private driver.”
296
 If cake decorators qualify as an integral part of a 
business named “Cakes by Karen,” drivers would logically qualify as an 
integral part of a business that represents itself as “everyone’s private 
driver.” Uber drivers are integral to the company’s business, and this 
factor, therefore, favors employee status. 
C. Contrasting the Economic Realities Analysis with the O’Connor 
Analysis 
In summary, the factors favor full-employee classification for Uber 
drivers. The drivers have little opportunity for profit or loss, their job 
does not require a special skill, and Uber drivers are essential to the 
company’s business model. The only clearly countervailing factors are 
                                                     
291. Id. 
292. 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989). 
293. Id. at 802–04. 
294. Id. at 811. 
295. Marlize van Romburgh, Uber in S.F. Is Now Three Times Bigger than City’s Entire Taxi 
Industry, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015 10:04 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/ 
blog/techflash/2015/01/uber-valuation-revenue-sf-taxi-industry-kalanick.html. 
296. Alyson Shontell, Uber CEO Explains His Company’s Highly Ambitious Goal to End Car 
Ownership in the World, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2015 12:07 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
ubers-plans-to-be-cheaper-than-owning-a-car-2015-2. 
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that the relationship is not permanent and Uber does not exercise 
significant control over its drivers’ daily activities. In light of these 
factors, Uber drivers have a viable claim under the “economic realities” 
test, as adopted by the Washington State Supreme Court in Anfinson, for 
employee designation under Washington wage statutes. 
The “economic realities” test is similar to the Borello test used in 
California, but lacks a predominant control factor.
297
 As discussed 
above, Uber drivers have thus far been successful in California, a 
jurisdiction where control is the predominant factor, despite the fact that 
the control factor is not as favorable to the drivers’ case as other factors 
within the analysis.
298
 In other words, if drivers can have success in 
O’Connor, it follows that drivers could be even more successful in 
Washington, a jurisdiction where control is not predominant. 
The implication of possible claims on the part of drivers should not be 
understated. If the drivers are indeed employees, Uber would be required 
to guarantee minimum wage, reimburse for expenses, and comply with 
worker protection regimes such as workers’ compensation schemes.
299
 In 
any case, the success of the O’Connor plaintiffs calls into question 
whether Uber would be able to survive a similar challenge in a 
jurisdiction, such as Washington, with an arguably more worker-friendly 
independent contractor test. 
CONCLUSION 
The ascendance of Uber in the ridesharing industry has been a boon to 
consumers.
300
 Much of this benefit has come at the expense of drivers, 
who are not guaranteed many of the labor protections that most 
employees enjoy.
301
 O’Connor v. Uber Technologies represents what 
could be the first of many lawsuits against Uber for misclassification of 
employees. When analyzing the distinctions between the California and 
                                                     
297. Compare Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 869, 281 P.3d 
289, 296 (2012), with S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 403 
(Cal. 1989). 
298. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 11, 2015). 
299. David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four Billion 
Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 144–51 (2015). 
300. See Taxi Competition, CHI. BOOTH IGM FORUM (Sept. 29, 2014, 9:10 AM), 
http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_eyDrhnya 
7vAPrX7 (showing that a vast majority of economists surveyed believe that ridesharing has 
increased taxi competition and thus benefitted consumers). 
301. Kosoff, supra note 5. 
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Washington independent contractor tests, serious questions about the 
viability of Uber’s labor model emerge. After the Washington State 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Anfinson v. FedEx, Uber drivers potentially 
hold the power to upend the rapidly-growing ridesharing industry in 
Washington. Although Uber designates its drivers as independent 
contractors, this designation may be erroneous. Courts are sure to 
address this question in the near future, with the result in O’Connor 
instructive as to how such a lawsuit would play out in Washington. As 
the number of independent contractors in America continues to grow, 
the issue could drive independent contractor litigation in other industries. 
 
